Minor safety incidents on the railways cause disruption, and may be indicators of more serious safety 23 risks. The following paper aimed to gain an understanding of the relationship between active and 24 latent factors, and particular causal paths for these types of incidents by using the Human Factors 25 Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to examine rail industry incident reports investigating such 26 events. 78 reports across 5 types of incident were reviewed by two authors and cross-referenced for 27 interrater reliability using the index of concordance. The results indicate that the reports were strongly 28 focused on active failures, particularly those associated with work-related distraction and 29 environmental factors. Few latent factors were presented in the reports. Different causal pathways 30 emerged for memory failures for events such a failure to call at stations, and attentional failures which 31 were more often associated with signals passed at danger. The study highlights a need for the rail 32 industry to look more closely at latent factors at the supervisory and organisational levels when 33 investigating minor safety of the line incidents. The results also strongly suggest the importance of a 34 new factor operational environment that captures unexpected and non-routine operating 35 conditions which have a risk of distracting the driver. Finally, the study is further demonstration of the 36 utility of HFACS to the rail industry, and of the usefulness of the index of concordance measure of 37 interrater reliability. 38
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the Office of Road & Rail has put forward a safety vision for zero workforce and industry-caused 44 passenger fatalities, and an ever-decreasing overall safety risk (ORR, 2014 ). If we are to move towards 45 a realisation of this vision, it is important to gain a detailed understanding of all of the factors which 46 contribute to accidents and incidents in order to put appropriate controls in place.
Recent analyses have argued that human error was a causal factor in the occurrence of many 48 serious and fatal rail accidents, both in the UK (French & Cope, 2012) and across Europe (Kyriakidis, 49 Pak, & Majumdar, 2015). On top of these more serious incidents, there are many hundreds of minor 50 incidents within the UK rail industry, many of which are also attributed to driver error. These include 51 speed exceedances and signals passed at danger (SPADs) that did not lead to any accidents, along with 52 trains that stop short or overshoot their platform, or fail to call altogether. These types of incident are 53 extremely costly for organisations due to fines and infrastructure costs, along with disruption leading 54 to negative public opinion. The most recent National Rail Passenger Survey showed that 55 punctuality/reliability was the factor with the biggest impact on overall customer satisfaction, and 56 how a train company dealt with delays had the biggest impact on overall dissatisfaction (NRPS, 2016) . 57
Additional costs arise as these incidents often require a driver to be removed from duty for an 58 investigation and possibly retraining. Furthermore, the concern is that a minor event is an indicator of 59 the risk of a more serious incident in the future (Reason, 1997; Hollnagel, 2014) . 60
The opportunity for minor safety of the line events to occur is huge. For example, the number 61 of approaches to red signals annually in the UK may be in the region of 7.5m (Gibson, Mills, Basacik, 62 & Harrison, 2015) . Few of these result in actual SPADs, and error probability for SPADs or events such 63 as wrong side door openings suggests error rates may be approaching the 64 limits of performance. Therefore, careful analysis of events is required if new levels of safety are to be 65 achieved, and there is a need for rail companies to understand what causes these events, so that 66 potential courses of remedial action can be identified including training, technical or procedural 67 change. 68 5 This database uses the Incident Factor Classification System (IFCS) of 10 factors that may shape human 96 performance in rail incidents . However, one of the most common frameworks for 97 analysis, ' (1990) model, is the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 98 (HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) . HFACS describes four levels ' " 99
Cheese Model (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006) : unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe 100 supervision, and organisational influences (see Figure 1) . Critically, this model specifies that in order 101 for an incident to occur, failures in defences at all levels of the system must line up, thus highlighting 102 the importance of identifying the factors which contribute at each level. The unsafe acts level focuses 103 on identifying any errors or violations made by front line workers that led to an accident or incident 104 occurring. Within the error category there are three subcategories of skill-based error, decision error, 105 and perceptual error. Decision errors can be further broken down into rule-based and choice-based 106 decisions, and skill-based errors can be broken down to attentional and memory failures. Within the 107 violations category there are two subcategories of routine and exceptional violations. 
110
The second level of the HFACS nsafe acts . These refer to 111 the immediate underlying conditions that contribute to the occurrence of unsafe acts. This level 112 comprises three categories: condition of operators, environmental factors, and personnel factors. 113
Each of these categories has a number of subcategories as shown in Figure 1 . The third level within 114 HFACS is unsafe supervision . This considers the situations where supervision was either lacking or 115 unsuitable and has four categories of inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, 116 failure to correct a problem, and supervisory violations. The fourth and final level within many 117 applications of HFACS models is organisational influences. This level looks at the failures occurring at 118 the higher managerial levels of the organisation which contributed to an accident, focusing on the 119 subcategories of resource management, organisational climate and organisational process.
7
Typically, HFACS is used as a retrospective tool for analysing accident and incident reports, 121 and the different failures which contributed to an accident at all four levels are identified. Although 122 originally designed to classify aviation accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003) , HFACS has now 123 been applied successfully in numerous safety critical industries including maritime (Celik & Cebi, 124 2009), mining Patterson & Shappell, 2010) , medicine (ElBardissi, Wiegmann, 125 Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007) and rail (Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; , with 126 researchers making various adaptations to the model to make it more suitable in different contexts. 127
One criticism of HFACS has been its failure to consider contributory factors outside of the organisation 128 involved, such as government policy, or local authority oversights (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 129 2012) . For that reason, some versions have gone beyond the organisational level to include 130 which take account of issues such as legislation gaps, administration oversights, and design 131 flaws (e.g. Chen, Wall, Davies, Yang, Wang, & Chou, 2013; . 132
Overall, the results of previous studies provide strong support for the use of HFACS as a tool 133 for understanding incidents in the rail industry. However, only two published studies have applied 134 HFACS in this context. Reinach and Viale (2006) and study focuses solely on switching yard incidents. However, to date, no published 144 study has focused on the hundreds of minor incidents linked to train drivers every year, such as signals 145 passed at danger or failure to call at stations. As previously noted, these incidents can have extremely 146 damaging consequences in terms of both infrastructure costs and negative public opinion. In addition, 147 the causal pattern of these incidents is often similar to that of more serious incidents (Wright & Van 148 der Schaaf, 2004). Although human error is often identified as a causal factor within these incidents, 149 there has been little effort to gain a systematic understanding of the latent factors which contribute, 150 and whether or not these differ depending on the type of incident which occurs. Studies across other 151 industries e.g. outdoor activity incidents, have shown the potential to identify multiple contributory 152 factors, both active and latent, from similar minor events, thus emphasizing the potential explanatory 153 power of these incidents (e.g. Salmon, Goode, Lenné, Finch & Cassell, 2014; Salmon, Goode, Taylor, 154
Lenné, Dallat, & Finch, in press). Therefore, gaining an understanding of minor safety-of-the-line 155 incidents is important to provide rail companies with the tools to prevent similar and more serious 156 incidents occurring in the future. 157 HFACS was chosen as the tool for the purposes of this study into the analysis of safety of the 158 line incidents. This was due to the number of studies generally that have used HFACS, its wide 159 availability and research base that makes its application clear and results transferrable, and its prior 160 use within the rail sector. 161 reliability levels. It is argued tha C K is an inadequate measure of reliability, as it is based 172 on the argument that coders who are coding randomly will agree by chance a certain percentage of 173 the time, and that this should be deducted from the agreement that is not achieved by chance. 174
Reliability and Report Quality
However in incident classification systems, coders are not randomly assigning codes but are actually 175 trying to identify the same causal factors, and therefore agreements are not chance events (Olsen, 176 2011) . For this reason, Olsen argues that the correct method for calculating inter-coder consensus is 177 to calculate the index of concordance which takes into account both the total number of agreements 178
An additional issue is that a number of authors in their study, with percentage agreement ranging from 40-75%, and as a result they only reported 183 the ratings of the first author in their paper. Thus, in this paper the index of concordance is used to 184 evaluate the reliability of HFACS as a tool for the categorisation of UK rail incident reports by two 185
Human Factors experts. 186
As outlined in Section 1.1, one of the main benefits of HFACS is in identifying latent factors 187 that can contribute to accident causation. However, this is dependent on the quality of investigation 188 and subsequent reporting of accidents. While significant rail accidents are subject to extensive 189 reporting, it was unclear whether it would be possible to identify latent features of accidents, at both 190 organisational levels and beyond, in the type of reports generated for minor safety of the line 191 incidents, or whether these investigations focus more on surface-level features relating to unsafe acts 192 and their preconditions. Rjabovs and Palacin (2015) found that there was a tendancy not to attribute 193 systemic, physical or design factors to the causation of SPADs in a metro environment, and it is likely 194 that a similar issue might arise when looking at other types of rail transport. Therefore, this paper also 195 aimed to measure the quality and depth of the information contained in minor incident investigation 196 reports. 197
Purpose of current study 198
This paper presents an application of HFACS as an analysis tool to aid with the understanding of 199 the factors that contribute to minor operational incidents in the UK rail. It aims to investigate the 200 breakdown of causal factors for these incidents, and in doing so evaluate whether the patterns found 201 Companies (TOCs). These incidents had all been previously classified by the TOCs as involving some 217 form of human error. A total of 74 investigation reports were included, all relating to minor safety-of-218 the-line incidents occurring between January 2012 and May 2014. None of the incidents included in 219 this study had been investigated by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), who investigate any 220 accidents causing death, serious injuries, or extensive damage, or incidents which had the potential 221 to lead to these serious effects. 5 main types of incident were included: 222  Signals passed at danger (SPADs, N=21) 223  Fail to call incidents, where a train failed to stop at a booked station (N=15) 224  Station Overruns, where a train overran the booked platform at a station (N=19) 225
 Stop Short incidents, where a train came to a stop at a station before all carriages were at the 226 platform (N=10) 227  TPWS Activations, where, for example, a train driver failed to acknowledge a speed restriction 228 warning (N=9) 229
Data Coding & Analysis 230
Investigation reports were independently coded by two Human Factors researchers. Prior to 231 commencing the HFACS coding, information about each incident was extracted, including a 232 description of the incident type, the location, and date. Each coder also rated the quality of the 233 investigation report as low, medium, or high depending on the amount of information included in the 234 report and the evidence provided for any conclusions drawn. Each report was then read in its entirety 235 and each contributing/safety factor identified in the incident narrative was mapped to a unique HFACS 236 category following the procedure identified by Baysari et al. (2008) of using the definitions and tables 237 provided in Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) and the flow-charts included in Viale and Reinach (2006) . 238
For example, in one report the investigator described a sign that was obscured by undergrowth. This 239 was extracted as a contributory factor and coded under the Physical Environment HFACS code. The 240 presence or the absence of each HFACS category was assessed in each accident report narrative. More 241 than one category or sub-category could be identified at each level. However, to avoid over-242
representation from any single accident, each HFACS sub-category was counted a maximum of only 243 once per accident (Li & Harris, 2006) . To begin the analysis process, each analyst first independently 244 coded 10 incidents. This coding was then discussed in detail to ensure a joint understanding prior to 245 independently analysing the rest of the papers. Where disagreements in the final codes arose, these 246 were discussed until a consensus was reached. 247
Once the initial analysis had begun, it became apparent that a total of 18 of the contributory 248 factors identified as belonging in the Environmental Factors category did not fit into either the physical 249 or technological environment, but rather could be described as arising from the operational 250 environment. These factors related to unscheduled operational occurrences that were a departure 251 from the operational norm, and examples included situations where there was a highly unusual 252 signalling pattern, or a train was re-routed. Therefore, an additional subcategory of Operational 253
Environment was included for this analysis (see Table 1 for examples). 254 255 Table 1 : Examples of report elements that were included in the Operational Environment category 256 1. A signalling fault led to modified working on the train route, requiring the use of hand signals to communicate with the signaller.
2.
A possession on a line led to the driver being directed onto a route that they were not familiar with.
3. An unusual signalling sequence led to a driver being directed to a different platform than usual.
Initial analysis of the incident characteristics and HFACS data were performed using frequency 257 counts. Further analysis to evaluate the associations between HFACS levels and incident types were 258 conducted using Chi Square analysis and adjusted standardized residuals (ASR). The ASR provides a 259 measure of the strength of the difference between observed and expected values in situations when 260 a cross-tabulation result is associated with more than one degree of freedom i.e. larger than a 2X2 261 contingency table. An ASR with a value of 2 or greater indicates a lack of fit of the null hypothesis in a 262
given cell (Sharpe, 2015) . 263
In order to evaluate interrater reliability the index of concordance was used to provide a 264 percentage agreement, following the procedure set out in Olsen and Shorrock (2010) . The proportion 265 of agreeing pairs of codes out of all the possible pairs of codes is calculated as follows: (agreements) 266 / (agreements + disagreements). Interrater consensus can then be reported as a figure between 0 and 267 1 or as a percentage. This method takes into account the cases where coders disagreed, along with 268 providing a method for including situations where there was a difference in the number of codes 269 assigned between coders. A criterion of 70% agreement between coders was adopted as a reasonable 270 minimum, in accordance with Wallace and Ross (2006) and Olsen and Shorrock (2010) . 271
Results

272
Inter-Rater Reliability & Quality of Reports 273
Prior to resolution of any discrepancies in coding between the two raters, the Index of 274
Concordance was used to evaluate inter-rater reliability ( Table 2 ). The results show that inter-coder 275 consistency was well above the 70% threshold at both the descriptor and category levels for all 276 variables other than Adverse Mental state where the consistency was 68.92%. This discrepancy will 277 be discussed further in Section 3.
278
It should be noted that the quality of the incident reports for each of these incident types 279 varied quite substantially across incident types (see Figure 2 ), leading to the identification of fewer 280 contributory factors where the quality was low. Reports categorised as being of low quality generally 281 contained only tick box information with no supporting data, medium quality reports contained a good 282 description of the incident with support data and information, but generally did not have a systematic 283 approach to evaluating human factors. High quality reports contained a good level of support data 284 and an attempt to systematically evaluate contributory human factors. In general Category A SPADs, 285
Station Overrun and Fail to Call reports tended to be of a high or medium quality, whereas TPWS 286 
Can HFACS help us to identify the precursors of minor operational incidents which 293
have the potential to lead to more serious events? 294
It was possible to code all of the contributing factors using our edited version of HFACS 295
including Operational Environment. The presence of HFACS codes in the 74 incidents is presented in 296 Unsafe acts were identified in all of the reports investigated. The most frequent Level 1 unsafe 299 acts were skill-based errors (87.84%). Of these skill-based errors, the majority involved some type of 300 attentional failure (56.76% incidents) such as failing to notice the status of a signal or getting 301 distracted. 41.89% of the skill based errors involved an issue with memory e.g. forgetting a station 302 stop. A decision error was identified in 12.16% of reports, all of which involved a poor choice e.g. not 303 making any attempt to stop at a station because of weather conditions. Finally, only 4.05% of unsafe 304 acts involved a violation, 2 of which were routine violations e.g. drivers always stopping at a certain 305 incorrect part of a platform to avoid passengers having to walk out in the rain, and one of which was 306 an exceptional violation involving a failure to clarify instructions. 307
One or more of the Level 2 preconditions for unsafe acts were evident in almost all incidents 308 investigated, with one exception (a TPWS Activation). Adverse mental state was identified as a 309 precondition in 85.16% incidents. Operational environment (24.32%), technological environment 310 (17.57%), adverse physiological state (16.22%), and physical/mental limitations (13.51%) were all also 311 identified as Level 2 contributory factors in 10 or more incidents. Unlike the pattern for other 312 industries, crew resource management was not a pre-dominant causal factor, and only emerged in 313 8.11% incidents.
As adverse mental state was deemed to be quite a broad category, and was also the category 315 where the inter-rater reliability was lowest, it was decided to explore the themes which emerged 316 within this category further (see Figure 3 ). Five main themes emerged. The most commonly identified 317 adverse mental state was work-related distraction, which occurred when drivers claimed to have been 318 distracted by thinking about something which had occurred during work hours -including problems in 319 the environment, time pressures, or previous driving patterns. Non-work related distraction occurred 320 when the driver was distracted by thinking about non-work issues e.g. relationship problems. Lapses 321 in concentration occurred when the driver claimed to have stopped concentrating on the task for no 322 particular reason. A preconception refers to situations in which the driver had made an incorrect 323 assumption about what would happen next. Finally, poor attitude not following procedures correctly 324 to avoid having a fault on record -was identified as contributory factor in one incident. As Figure 3  325 shows, drivers were considerably more likely to be distracted by work-related issues than non-work 326 related ones. Of the 31 cases in which work-related distraction was identified, environmental issues 327 were also identified in 18 of these reports (58.06%), suggesting a strong link between any unexpected 328 changes to the driving environment and the propensity for the driver to lose focus. The weaker inter-329 rater reliability of adverse mental state can be accounted for by the fact that one rater was more 330 inclined to only identify the environmental code in these cases, where the other rater selected both 331 categories. 332 Table 3 shows that there was a difference in the pattern of contributory factors for each of 343 the five incident types. In order to determine where significant differences between the groups 344 emerged a series of chi-square analyses were conducted. Three of these relationships reached 345 significance and these are explored further in Table 4 and Figure 4 . 346 
Discussion
362
The aim of the study was to examine the active and latent causal factors of minor safety of 363 the line incidents, using the HFACS methodology, and one purpose of the research was to understand 364 the utility of HFACS for the task at hand. A number of specific research questions were outlined, which 365 are addressed below. 366
Can HFACS help us to identify the precursors of minor operational incidents? 367
74 minor incident investigations were analysed using HFACS to identify the factors which 368 contribute to the occurrence of these types of events. In total, 228 contributory factors were identified 369 and classified from the reports. The findings provide some initial evidence that the pattern of 370 contributory factors for minor incidents is similar to that identified in more serious incidents (e.g. Adverse mental state was the most commonly identified category across all of the incidents 388 investigated. As it is quite a broad category, a deeper analysis was deemed necessary and it was, 389 therefore, further broken down into 5 main themes. This analysis showed that distraction due to work-390 related issues was the single biggest contributory factor. Some caution should be taken in interpreting 391 this result, as this finding arises from self-report aspects of the report and it is possible that drivers 392 were unable to accurately remember, or chose to misrepresent what they had been thinking about 393 prior to an incident. However, the fact that environmental factors, in particular operational 394 environment, were also identified as a causal factor in over half of the reports suggests that work-395 related distraction is a real issue in incident causation.
Linked to this, one of the key findings of this study was the importance of the operational 397 environment. The items in this category were environmental factors that were not overtly physical 398 (e.g. weather) or technical (e.g. faulty equipment), but altered driving conditions based on operational 399 circumstances -such as other late running trains in the area causing the incident-involved train to run 400 on cautionary signals, or a temporary change to the station calling pattern. While these situations are 401 required competency, they were a deviation from planned or routine action. 402
Cognitively, changes to the operational environment create a situation where the driver moves from 403 a skill-based, proactive feedforward mode of control (Rasmussen, 1983; Hollnagel and Woods, 2005) , 404 to a more rule-based, and cognitively effortful (and error prone), reactive mode of control. To amplify 405 the risk, this change of mode takes place just at that point where the driver is likely to be late or trying 406 to preserve tight performance allowances in the timetable. Thus, they have the paradox of needing to 407 work faster at a time when the environment demands, cognitively, that they take longer. The problems identified in these analyses are not unique to the rail industry, and indeed similar 412 incidents can easily be identified in other industries. For example, in aviation a flight path may have 413 to be changed at short notice, or in medicine a routine operation may become more complex due to 414 unforeseeable complications. Thus, the addition of the category of Operational Environment to HFACS 415 would provide an additional opportunity to understand the impact of alterations to planned routine 416 on the propensity for incidents to occur. 417
On the whole, these results highlight the potential power of minor incidents to provide valuable 418 insights into common causal factors, at least at the unsafe acts and preconditions levels, and to 419 reinforce some of the similarities (importance of skill-based error, and adverse mental state) and reduced emphasis on CRM) between train driving and other domains. This highlights that a simple 422 transfer of initiatives, such as training programmes, from other domains (e.g. aviation) into train 423 driving is not always appropriate, and indicates where adaption (e.g. an emphasis on attentional over 424 CRM-type support) is required. unusual sequence of restrictive aspects; was found to be significantly linked to the occurrence of a 433 SPAD. Although the SPAD investigations included in this study were relatively minor events with no 434 major repercussions, similar circumstances have been identified in more serious incidents. As far back 435 as 1997, a study of over 100 Australian railway incidents identified that the expectation of a green 436 signal was one of the most common skill-based errors contributing to drivers passing a red signal 437 (Edkins & Pollock, 1997) , and recent major incident investigations have re-iterated this finding (e.g. 438 RAIB, 2014). Similarly, Rjabovs and Palacin (2016) found that unfamiliar tasks and locations may play 439 a role in safety of the line incidents in a metro environment. In our paper it may not be that the 440 location was unfamiliar as such, but that the conditions in which the location was experienced may be 441 unfamiliar or, at least, a divergence from the norm. This highlights the importance of providing 442 additional support to drivers in situations which are more cognitively effortful, suggesting that 443 interventions which specifically address the methods of communicating and alerting drivers to areas 444 of importance during changes to the operational environment could be successful in reducing the 445 occurrence of SPADs. 446
In addition, it appears that Category A SPADs and TPWS activations (which have the capacity 447 to escalate to become a SPAD) were both more likely to be caused by an attentional failure, while Fail 448 to Call and Station Overrun incidents were more likely to be caused by a memory failure. The fact that 449 different causal paths are emerging suggests that companies need to take different approaches to 450 how they address these incidents and, in some cases, technical solutions will be required, similar to 451 the ones reported by Basacik and Gibson (2015) for wrong side door openings. Read, Lenné, and Moss 452 (2012) found that task demand factors (e.g. high workload, distraction) were significantly associated 453 with skill-based errors in Australian rail accidents. We have further broken this down to show how the 454 impacts of different types of skill-based error (i.e. memory versus attention) can vary, suggesting that 455 safety interventions need to be carefully targeted to maximise their benefits. For example, technical 456 systems to more clearly alert drivers of diagrammed station stops may be beneficial in preventing Fail 457
to Call and Station Overrun incidents, whereas improving communication of the likely risk areas during 458 non-routine running may reduce the risk of a SPAD. 459
What is the breakdown of active and latent factors that contribute to this type of 460 incident, and does this vary across incident types? 461
Active factors dominated the causes identified from the incident analysis. Due to the small 462 number of organisational and supervisory factors identified, it was impossible to identify any causal 463 paths originating at these levels. In addition, some of the reports around TPWS activations, Stop Short, 464
and Fail to Call incidents were of a low quality containing minimal information, which was usually 465 related solely to driver error no Supervisory or Organisational Factors were identified in any of the 466 Fail to Call reports. In these reports it was often quite difficult to build a picture of the events which 467 led up to the incident. Although, these incidents are often seen as quite minor, and companies have 468 to make trade-offs in terms of the costs associated with detailed investigations; being able to address 469 the causes of these minor incidents and eliminate them is likely to significantly reduce the risk of a 470 more serious incident occurring (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004) , and result in greater savings in the 471 long run. The fact that it was possible to identify differences in causal pathways from even basic quality 472 minor investigations provides evidence of the importance of using minor events and near misses to 473 further our understanding of how safety systems can be improved. 474
It is important to note, however, that even in reports with extensive data e.g. for SPADs or Station 475
Overruns, there were still few references to organisational and supervisory issues, and many that were 476 identified were cases where a driver had not yet completed relevant training after a prior incident 477 F T 478 discussed next. Certainly, the perception of driver error as captured in the reports is that the issues lie 479 in active factors, and this reinforced by train operating companies interest in Non-Technical Skills 480 programmes. 481
What is the quality of reporting of minor incidents in the rail industry? 482
Building on the point above, one of the questions entering into this study was whether reports 483 contained enough detail to identify issues arising at the supervisory, organizational and regulatory 484 levels. In practice the number of examples of this kind of factors in the data were few and far between. 485 This is one of the major drawbacks of using HFACS as a tool to investigate more minor accidents, as 486 several studies have found that systems approaches are hugely dependent on the quality of the data 487 provided (e.g. Lenné et al., 2012) . The majority of the investigations reported in this study were carried 488 out by front-line supervisors rather than dedicated accident investigators, and thus it is perhaps 489 unsurprising that these supervisors might be reluctant to find fault with themselves and, in many 490 cases, their employers. Research shows that latent errors pose the greatest risk to system safety 491 (Reason, 1990; , and it is a key characteristic that these latent errors are the pre-conditions that 492 enable active errors to occur. It is therefore important that organisations are able to identify these 493 latent errors to mitigate against potentially serious accidents occurring in the future. 494 However, it is important not to appear too critical of reporting. Of all 74 reports identified by train 495 operators as being related to human error, all did cover human error and presented issues that fitted the report (e.g. that it was primarily a technical fault). This suggests a good level of understanding of 498 basic human factors within the industry, and further work could help to refine or expand that 499 understanding to seek out more latent factors. Further work to develop investigation and reporting 500 around supervisory, organisation and external factors should not just look to support accident analysis 501 using HFACS. This level of reporting would also help assist in the identification of causes of accident 502 using systems-orientated approaches such as STAMP (Leveson, 2004) and Accimap (Rasmussen, 503 1997) . 504
How reliably can two independent Human Factors experts code investigation reports 505
using HFACS 506
On the whole, the research team found HFACS to be a straightforward tool to use, although it was 507 not without its flaws. Previous research had identified problems with inter-rater reliability, and 508 difficulties in identifying the level at which factors should be categorised (Olsen, 2011; Olsen & 509 Shorrock, 2010; Baysari et al., 2008). Olsen (2011) investigated the success of air traffic controllers and 510 human factors specialists in applying HFACS consistently and found that neither group achieved 511 acceptable agreement levels between raters. However, this was not a problem in the current study, 512 with inter-rater reliability reaching an acceptable level in all categories other than Adverse Mental 513 State, where it was just below the 70% agreement level advocated. Prior to beginning the coding 514 process, both raters had spent some time agreeing on their interpretation of each of the categories 515 and this may have aided the coding process. Also, all incidents had already been classified by the train 516 operating companies as relating to human error, which again may have reduced some of the scope 517 for variance. 518
Limitations 519
A limitation of this study, particularly for TPWS activation and Stop Short events was the lack 520 of data in the reports, and, as noted above, all of the reports lacked information on supervisory and depth of conclusions that can be drawn from the reports regarding causal factors. As noted under data 523 quality, a second factor is the potential bias in the reports through the reliance on the skills of the line 524 managers and supervisors as investigators. These investigators could not be assumed to have 525 extensive training or knowledge of Human Factors, and may have a personal relationship with the 526 driver they were interviewing. Thirdly, putting aside the role of the investigator, the drivers were asked 527 to recall their thoughts and mental states at the time of the incident. This is also likely to be biased, 528 and caution must be taken when interpreting any self-report data. A final limitation is that HFACS was 529 the only interpretation tool used in the study. While the aims of the study were practical, rather than 530 a study of methodology, it might be useful to compare different tool outputs e.g. Accimap (Rasmussen, 531 1997 ), STAMP (Leveson, 2004) , along with the Incident Factor Classification Study which is being 532 adopted in the UK rail section . 533
Conclusions
534
The current study successfully applies HFACS to provide a retrospective analysis of minor 535 incident investigations in the rail industry. Such examination of minor incidents provides a much wider 536 scope for us to interpret accident causal pathways, as these incidents occur much more frequently 537 than more serious incidents. By highlighting the differences in the causes of different incident types, 538 a greater level of understanding of the mechanisms required to prevent future incidents is achieved. 539
Active failures, specifically those related to attention and adverse mental state, dominate the 540 results, suggesting that measures to reduce safety of the line incidents should be targeted at these 541 areas. However, it is important to stress that training approaches should not be the only solution, and 542 more systemic solutions are also required. Currently, supervisory and organisational issues are under-543 represented in the reports, and therefore more efforts should be made to identify latent factors that 544 might be setting up the preconditions for active failures. Uncovering these latent errors may need rail 545 companies to refine the current approach to minor incident investigation, in order to ensure that all Finally, this study has also identified the importance of the operational environment in 548 shaping risk. Gibson et al (2015) put the case that as an aggregate, performance may be approaching 549 a ceiling, and that further investigation is required to target specific locations or circumstances that 550 might lead to error. From this analysis, we argue that operational environment may be one of those 551 factors. To test this, one could compare the risk of SPAD for signals approached at red when 552 operational conditions were out of the norm, from those approached in normal circumstances. If 553 operational environment is a factor, then SPAD risk will be found to be higher. Also, it would also be 554 interesting to investigate whether similar differences emerge in the causal factors of incidents on 555 different types of routes (e.g. high-speed trains versus metro-links). 556
